While Totalitarianism and After Utopia discussed totalitarian ideology and its consequences for modern political thought, the Eichmann report and Legalism dealt with the question whether and how justice is possible after the extreme experience of totalitarianism. We argue that the maieutic impulse led Arendt and Shklar to find distinct routes to address a common concern. Our paper ends with a discussion of some of the surplus meaning that was generated by the different maieutic performances of the two thinkers.
However, as Katznelson and Greif have argued, the debate also contained contributions that seemed to constitute attempts at re-enlightenment (Greif 2015: 22f) , a form of enlightenment that was modest, self-reflective and critical of the promise of built-in progress that some advocates of the classic Enlightenment tradition had signalled (Katznelson 2003: 4ff) . Instead of throwing out the baby with the bathwater through a dialectical but in effect totalising critique of the Enlightenment (as in the case of Horkheimer/Adorno or Lewis Mumford), such contributions conceded that something had gone wrong and that man was in need of protection, restraint and badly in need of "a new science for a new world" (ibid, 2). Such re-orientation or, in the words of Greif, re-enlightenment did not produce towering figures along the lines of Rousseau, Hume, Kant or Voltaire and certainly never took the form of comprehensive system-building; rather this new generation of post-war scholars and writers purported to protect or attempt to restrain man from his own extreme thought and actions, yet without seeking help from a God or Supreme Being and without a sense of inevitable progress towards the betterment of the human race.
Often this reasoning took on the form of maieutic discourse (24f). Maieutics refers to a classic rhetorical tool that employs the Socratic method of "insistent and forceful questioning" in order to "bring to birth in another person answers that will reward the questioner's own belief in the character of the universal capacity for thinking -and do something to the other person's character, too" (ibid). Greif points out that there is a strong normative dimension in this: "Maieutics are shoulds in discourse or within the intellectual life that help to say what must be addressed and talked about, what stands up as a serious or profound question or contribution, regardless of its ability to solve or determine the inquiry" (ibid 25). As the main subject of such a discourse he identifies the new transatlantic intellectual community, and within it particularly those emigrants who had direct experience of totalitarian regimes and/or had managed to escape them just in time. In the post-war years these émigrés and exiles from Continental Europe gave a sense of authenticity and credibility to the American debates.
Greif identifies a number of tropes and concepts and a certain nomenclature when it came to the émigrés' maieutic discourses. These involved discussion of 'the human condition', 'situation(s)' and their 'existential' dimensions, the 'crisis of the individual', new and insightful discussions of the meanings of 'guilt' and 'fear' (or freedom from fear) and -perhaps most pronounced -a new conception of 'human rights' (ibid 68ff), including, for the first time, 'the right to have rights' (ibid 95). Whereas Greif's study focuses, with a handful of exceptions, on literary figures and fiction writing, Katznelson's earlier study identified an American circle of politically and theoretically motivated 'reconstructionists' who took on the challenge of promoting and practising a new form of political study (Katznelson 2003, 35) . These scholars pursued 'a pathway to knowledge about how humankind might secure the benefits of Enlightenment without staggering into unreasoning by seeking 'to create a new knowledge base for a more capable political liberalism ' (ibid, 4) . The latter in particular implied tackling two problems: the question of evil and the creation of a realistic political science. 1 In this paper we compare and contrast two related, but in many ways also differing, ways of showing, at least in outline, that a new world also needs a new mode of understanding. Arendt and Shklar, both émigré scholars, thought about totalitarianism and its legal repercussions and participated in the postwar maieutic turn that Greif (and less sharp Katznelson) identified. In order to reveal the distinctiveness of their respective contributions, we take a closer look at the two sets of studies they published between 1951 and 1964: Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (the former released in 1951, the latter 1 Thanks to four anonymous referees for their insightful comments and to James Brown, Philip Spencer and Albert Weale for their help in honing the argument. Katznelson's selection of social scientists and scholars remains highly eclectic. His distillation owes much to the conceptual toolbox of Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia (Katznelson 162ff) , producing badly aggregated ideal-type groupings in the process. As a consequence his 'American political studies enlightenment' remains a metaphysical club, a post festum sociological-theoretical construction that is based, if at all, on very thin empirical and historical evidence. Both Arendt and Shklar can be seen as responding to the same problem: the catastrophe in Europe and the political extremes it produced had overstepped the limits of legal and philosophical thinking and required something new. But their respective maieutic discourses, whilst addressed to this same problematic, evince distinct strengths and face different limitations. Arendt, the older of the two émigré women, came into contact with the catastrophe more directly than did Shklar, and this direct experience seems to have made her more attuned to and afflicted by the contingency of moral norms and juridical structures. Shklar, on the other hand, was still a young adolescent when she left Europe, and her orientation to the task of thinking about the limits of law and the requirements of politics is less marked by extremity than is that of Arendt. Moreover, Shklar's maieutic practice was conducted overwhelmingly within the context of teaching, so that she was called to trace out the latent logic of the arguments of others from within the parameters of an established academic context. On the other hand, Arendt, whilst engaging in some teaching, to a considerable extent practised maieutics on herself -her work is an attempt to understand what she has witnessed and has an existential quality. This can be registered by noting that while Arendt wrote about the 'human condition' and 'crisis', Shklar does not adopt this terminology. She remains more circumspect and her work points toward an antifoundational politics of law. Arendt's observations sometimes lack the consistency of Shklar's, but they have greater directness and therefore can be seen to fulfil a different role. Together, their work makes an important contribution to thinking about justice and law after totalitarianism.
Before we delve into a more detailed discussion, a caveat needs to be mentioned: our aim is to clarify how the two thinkers in question tried to re-conceive the critical task of enlightened thinking. It is not an intellectual history (or proper history writing for that matter) but an attempt to argue that a particular historical constellation, combined with direct émigré experience, produced ideas for re-enlightenment that had a 'surplus'. Each author, and the comparison between them, deserves much more space and detailed attention than we have at our disposal here. Hannah Arendt and Judith N. Shklar both used maieutic discourses but did not primarily employ fiction (like Greif's feature writers) or scholarship from the social sciences or humanities (like Katznelson); notably though both make occasional use of literary sources to demonstrate their argument. Rather their work consisted, at least for the time period that interests us here , of political-theoretical reflections of two sorts: (1) analyses and critiques of ideologies and forms of understanding that lend themselves to major misunderstandings and, potentially, to political abuse by totalitarian powers; and (2) discussions of whether law and legal procedures such as political trials could provide answers to the problem of how to address the major injustices that victims had suffered at the hands of totalitarian regimes. It is to these two main tropes that we now turn.
Biographical and Historical Background
Before discussing the studies in detail, we would first like to point out briefly and in each case where the publications can be located in the authors' respective careers.
This does not mean that we intend to reduce Arendt's or Shklar's arguments to mere biographical details. The purpose of mentioning such details is to demonstrate that there is indeed some connection between their respective life experiences and the distinct appellative dimension of each of their writings. The change of perspective required for re-enlightenment and the radical questioning of traditional thinking proposed by both Arendt and Shklar -part of what Greif understands by maieuticsonly seem explicable by looking at their experiences as refugees and exiles. (As we will see in both cases, there are also considerable individual differences in how these 2 We are interested here mainly in a limited juxtaposition of Arendt and Shklar that covers their reflections on totalitarianism and justice and that is marked by many joint or overlapping epistemological interests, some interesting parallels in their argumentation and rhetoric, and also some finer, yet important, distinctions. In this paper we make only occasional reference to a second juxtaposition in which other themes become more important, such as Arendt's republicanism vs. Shklar's conceptualisation of the liberalism of fear, particularly in relation to the American politicalintellectual tradition. In this latter encounter Shklar takes a much more critical stand toward Arendt; however, this discussion is, at least in this paper, only briefly hinted at. For a more comprehensive discussion see Hess 2014, particularly 135-176 . For a brief overview of Shklar's life and oeuvre see Hess 2015. conditions were experienced, mainly due to differences of biological age and political generation, but also because of their distinct locations vis-à-vis their respective publics).
Most readers will be familiar with the name Hannah Arendt (1906 Arendt ( -1975 In contrast to Arendt, who had become truly a public intellectual, Shklar would always remain within academic confines, writing for a much narrower intellectual readership, despite refusing a specialist academic language: she observed that political theory is the 'elucidation of common experience' (Shklar 1964: 28 the latter part of her life. We should also take into account that, although both had been refugees and exiles, they were so at different ages: in Arendt's case this occurred as a young but experienced adult, while Shklar was a young adolescent. While Arendt had some first-hand experiences of being politically engaged in resistance activities, the same cannot be said for Shklar because she was simply too young. Arendt had also experienced National Socialism directly and consciously and moreover had a pretty good insight into how Stalinism worked since she was together with Heinrich
Blücher, an ex-communist who discussed the matter of Stalinism with her. Both experiences are clearly reflected in her writings. Shklar, in contrast, had become a refugee and exile at an early age and her experiences were more related to the traumatic flight and narrow escape together with her family. Only later, at Harvard, and there mainly through Carl Joachim Friedrich, did she become aware of the deeper problems of totalitarianism, including the difficulty of its conceptualisation and the problems this caused for the understanding and explanation of this extreme phenomenon. As we know, she also became an astute follower of the news reports concerning the legal trials and debates that followed World War II, including the increasing differences between western democracies and Soviet Union style dictatorship, some of which was expressed in debates about legal norms and practices.
Let us just add a few words about the order in which the books appeared. In Arendt's and Shklar's works we can see a similar pattern: each published a book on the ideological origins of totalitarianism, and each followed it up with a discussion of the legal repercussions of the totalitarian experience. This fact is complicated by a difference in terms of publication record. Arendt also published other books between the totalitarianism book and the Eichmann report, while Shklar did not. It is here that we have to take into account the different life paths, experiences and departure points in terms of writing. However, as we will see, while many views are shared in relation to such matters as epistemological starting points or perspectives, mainly due to the shared experience of having been refugees and exiles, there are also important differences. These differences particularly affect the way each of them employed maieutic rhetoric; on this they would not always see eye to eye.
Arendt and Shklar on Totalitarianism and Political Utopias
Origins of Totalitarianism is a book that with hindsight appears to have been given the wrong title. The book originally consisted of three more or less interlinked 'crystallizations' (Antisemitism, Imperialism and Totalitarianism); yet, later paperback editions have published these parts in three separate volumes. The original thick volume (containing almost 600 pages) that was published in 1951 reflected
Arendt's conflicting intentions: first, to write about nineteenth century political ideas;
and secondly, to study what was truly new in the twentieth century, namely Stalinism and National Socialism. Together these historical and epistemological concerns were treated as two appearances of one and the same new phenomenon -totalitarianism.
As is evident from the finished product, the three parts don't really link up, Cold War years, a time when the two superpowers were locked into a major confrontation and when no renewal was in sight. Like Arendt, Shklar notes the fragility of post-war conditions, which was not helped by ideological stasis; however, unlike Arendt who put her hopes into anything from rather metaphysical-sounding new beginnings ('natality' is the key word here) to the radical proposal of councilbased forms of governance, Shklar pursued a more realistic project by pointing to the need for some clear-headed political theory at a time when old-fashioned 'liberalism has become unsure of its moral basis, as well as increasingly defensive and conservative' (Shklar 1957: viii From the romantic and ultimately 'tragic way of life' it was just a short step to the 'unpolitics' of a Burckhardt, Nietzsche or Spengler, all of whom developed subjective and artistic answers to the modernisation process but fell remarkably short in 6 Though see Benhabib (1996) for an interpretation of Arendt as a 'reluctant modernist'.
responding to the question of how a modern and functioning democratic system could operate. This was not where the decline stopped. To reach the final stage of defeat and defeatism more was necessary than an unhappy consciousness and the flight into art.
While all this did not help to erect any barriers against the totalitarian threat a new low was only reached with a generation of philosophers who would come to dominate philosophy and critical thinking for much of the twentieth centuryExistenzphilosophen. Here, Shklar directly attacked those thinkers that Arendt held dear. What was missing in the arguments of such thinkers as Heidegger and Jaspers and Existenzphilosophie and its later derivate Existentialism? For Shklar, these thinkers and their philosophies were deeply a-political and contributed absolutely nothing to the furthering of political theory; rather, they promoted a sense of man being nothing but a victim, 'of the world", of time, of death, of history, of society, of everything external to himself ' (1957: 120) . The notion of the absurd, the meaningless of modern life, the metaphysical guilt of being in the world, disgust, futility -all these ideas contributed very little or nothing to democratic thinking and the development of Of course, it is not the case that Arendt gives us no criteria for thinking about the stabilising effects of law and its importance in providing regularity in order that politics can take place. Toward the end of The Origins of Totalitarianism she refers precisely to this feature of the operation of law in commenting on the way legal systems proscribe rather than prescribe behaviour: they tell us what we should not do,
rather than documenting what we should do (Arendt 2004 (Arendt [1991 : 601). This is an important prelude to recognising the ways in which a pluralistic polity will need to be underscored and lived through law since it is the legal apparatus that can deliver the 'right to have rights' (376ff how it applied to the reason for conviction. They applied the death penalty to those who were guilty of starting a war, assuming that most of the accused were also guilty of crimes against humanity -yet they abstained from basing their final verdict on such crimes against humanity; crimes against peace and war crimes remained the leading ideas.
When it came to discussing whether the Eichmann trial should have taken place in Jerusalem and in an Israeli courtroom or whether it should take place somewhere 'neutral' and in front of an international court, Arendt was equally outspoken and pointed towards further contradictions. She argued that a strange quid pro quo logic prevailed: true, the trial in Jerusalem took place because of the physical extermination of Jews, but in this respect an Israeli court was as good as any nation's court; however, Arendt also pointed out that in attempting to exterminate the Jews as a group, the Nazis (and Eichmann) had committed a crime against humanity. While the selection of victims was due to anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism, the actual crime against humanity (including its administrative dimension) is something of such general and universal importance that it deserved an international court or tribunal. If there was one major lesson to be learned from Nuremberg then it was that the Nazis had disrupted the human order and needed therefore to stand trial and be convictednot because of the sheer number or the specific selection of victims. Arendt argued further that once it had been established that the Jerusalem court was zuständig (legitimate and appropriate) to hear the Eichmann case such arguments as the ones mentioned above unfortunately became of secondary importance. Arendt concluded that while one could of course debate both the location and the different legal rationalities, from a human standpoint, and from the standpoint of the newly conceived crimes against humanity, Eichmann nonetheless deserved to be punished (and to die): he and the Nazis had assumed a god-like position when they determined which groups of people deserved the right to live on this planet and which did not. In contrast to Arendt, this was not the reason the Jerusalem judges gave in their ruling and for Eichmann's conviction but they hanged the man nevertheless.
In fact, Arendt's reflection on the judges' deliberations reveals something interesting about her position on law generally and natural law in particular; for Arendt law and morals are distinct, yet they require a relation. She refers to the 'helplessness' of the Jerusalem judges, faced with a man they struggled to understand in order to judge.
She observes that Eichmann was evidence of a 'new type of criminal' who 'commits crimes under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he is doing wrong ' (2006 [1963] : 276). So Arendt's ascription of 'thoughtlessness' to Eichmann produces a problem for her: how can it be right to convict him? We should note that whilst this might make for a prosecutorial problem, mens rea being a fundamental part of criminal law, nonetheless on legal grounds he could (and was) of course convicted of crimes committed. The problem for Arendt seems to be that, along with Jaspers, she held to a subjectivist account of moral guilt (see also particularly with the question of whether it is actually possible for those liberal proponents and defenders of the rule of law to escape political conflict. For Shklar, this is impossible, as she tries to show in the case of the Nuremberg and the Eichmann trials. Legalism is, for her, 'an ethical attitude that holds moral conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of duties and rights determined by rules' (Shklar 1964: 1) . She asks us to imagine a continuum in which we have at one end personal conduct and morality, and at the other end the institutions and those legal procedures that kick in if and when rules are broken (1964: 3) . In between we find a whole set of arrangements and institutions that deal with moral issues, rights and duties, and so on. Since conflict is programmed into modern pluralistic societies, the referral to legalism has become a kind of refuge, a way of settling conflict by peaceful, democratic and legitimate means. However, it has also become subject to political debate: How responsive is the legal system in a democracy? Are the courts not necessarily that part of society that is most interested in maintaining order, despite the fact that societies and their laws are always subject to change?
To these questions Shklar holds an answer ready. With reference to Max Weber she describes the rationality behind lawful procedures and how these developed in the western world. Shklar also points out that there is not one universal rationality but rather a number of different legal traditions in the West; legalism is in other words a 13 Note, for example, her insistence on writing of the 'human condition' rather than 'human nature' and her emphasis on the fact that men not 'Man' occupy the earth.
'tradition of traditions'. Shklar also stresses that the development of legalism has led to a situation where law and politics appear to have become separated, making it particularly difficult to conduct trials in which politics figure largely, either in the sense that legalism has to deal with political regimes and ideologies such as National Socialism and Stalinism, or that legal trials are conducted that have themselves a political character. Both were obviously the case at Nuremberg. Here Shklar maintains that there are rare occasions 'when political trials may actually serve liberal ends, where they promote legalistic values in such a way as to contribute to constitutional politics or a decent legal system' (1964: 145).
Shklar continues: 'To be sure, within a stable constitutional order political trials may be a disgrace, a reversion to the politics of repression, but it is not the political trial itself but the situation in which it takes place and the ends that it serves which matter.
It is the quality of the politics pursued in them that distinguishes one political trial from another ' (1964: 145) . As pointed out earlier, for Shklar there cannot be such a thing as law totally free from political conditions and purposes. At the same time, it is important in circumstances such as political trials to realise the limitations of legal procedures and to distinguish between different ends. As Shklar observes, 'there is politics and politics' (ibid), meaning that as a consequence formal justice should not be regarded as an end in itself; it cannot create the democratic order. This, according to Shklar, was the illusion and the fallacy of the judges at Nuremberg: If only the laws were seen to be operating, the illusion of functioning democratic institutions and politics could be created. On her account, the situation became even more complex when dealing with politically important charges such as crimes against humanity. It was a legalistic illusion, maintains Shklar, to think that in the end the Nuremberg trials could provide for the future of international criminal law. She notes: 'the trial was a tribute both to the intellectual limitations of legalism as an ideology and to the real political value which legalism has in practice, even if it refuses to recognise this clearly ' (1964: 147) .
The problem was in other words: How do trials that deal with extreme situations fit into our normal continuum? How do liberal democratic governments react to a modern crisis in values and morals? It is true that the trials took place in something of a legal vacuum. As Shklar rightly stresses, at the time there was (and continues to be) debate as to whether there is a properly functioning system of international criminal law (see e.g. Moyn 2013 , Schabas 2000 , 2011 . Unlike domestic criminal trials, international ones have to constitute the conditions for their own legitimacy as they work. Nonetheless, to all observers at Nuremberg it was self-evident that something had to be done with the Nazi perpetrators, and it is in this context that the newly invented crimes against humanity emerged. It is interesting though that this invention still did not come to be radically applied as law during the trials; as Arendt had stressed, only one of the accused actually was found guilty of such crimes.
Like Arendt, Shklar maintains that a sense of justice was the main driving force behind the trials both in Nuremberg and in Jerusalem. This is very much against the notion of positive law that maintains that legal procedure and justice are not the same and may not even be connected. Shklar emphasises that the new crimes committed and the trials conducted led to an interpretation that again put together what had become separated. She stresses that after the experience of totalitarianism it became harder to maintain that legal procedures, justice and politics were not linked at all (though the tenacity of natural law and positivist approaches to legal autonomy suggest a continued desire to separate them). However, as Shklar also notes, such new thinking was still marked by differences in the way we think, for example, about causality. The bureaucratic effort to exterminate all Jews and its causes will still continue to be defined differently by lawyers, historians -and, indeed, political theorists. In contrast to Arendt, Shklar's argument has another maieutic dimension.
For Shklar, the main purpose of political theory is the art of distinguishing, in this case, between different degrees of legalism. In that respect she is interested in the refinement of legal reasoning and judgment and the politics that support such reasoning or judgment. This is very much in contrast to Arendt who thought that it was more human judgment itself that was the problem.
We might further ask where Shklar's presumption of a sense of justice comes from.
As we have seen, Arendt gestures toward morality being innate and pre-social in the human being. 14 It is not clear that Shklar can reasonably make this assumption, but perhaps her argument is protected in avoiding the question by being seated in a 14 See also Robert Fine (2013) relatively functioning democracy. She uses the term 'legalism' to refer to an ideology. When after the war Arendt returned to Germany as a reporter she found a country in which all had collapsed (Arendt 2007 (Arendt [1945 (Arendt , 1950 (Arendt and 1954 if we look at how modern natural law arguments were initiated in the seventeenth century we find they gained ground insofar as they promised to fix the problems of non-consensus in countries torn by religious and civil war (see Tuck 1979) . And one of the abiding problems of natural law arguments ever since has been how to deal with change.
16 See also 2004 [1951] : 299, where Arendt argues that without 'transcendent measurements of religion or the law of nature' there is no measure of things.
The intractable problem of how to generate and maintain a political community whilst at the same time not forestalling dissent is one of which Shklar was very well aware, especially as a student of Rousseau. For Rousseau the problem was one of how to move from society as an aggregation of individual wills -the will of all, to the General Will, a condition that transcends and unifies us, the body politic. This, according to Rousseau, requires our 'denaturing'. Some, not least Arendt, have read
The Social Contract as a guide book to totalitarianism (see Talmon 1952 ). This is not right, but the radicalism of Rousseau's solution does highlight the problem of how the many are to become one. We've still not managed to come up with models of political community that depart very far from this (see I. M. Young 1990). Of course this need not take the form Rousseau prescribes (after all, we can hardly move to eighteenth century Corsica) but the issue of how to constitute viable community is an abiding one for political theory, and is tied to the legitimacy or otherwise of legal structures.
This concern was at the root of Arendt's resistance to ideas of sovereignty and her insistence on thinking of politics in terms of plurality. Note that proceduralism in law does not resolve this, since this still leaves an absence where some substantive determination of the people must be. 17 So it is surprising that Shklar rides over these matters so freely in asserting that in the present (1964) natural law arguments are coercive of consensus. She's clearly playing devil's advocate, not at least in the context of her colleagues at the Harvard Law School (some of whose students and later faculty she had taught). The trouble is, absent some version of natural law, the decisionism of Shklar's political reasoning threatens to leave her stranded, or confined in importance to contexts that already benefit from established rules of procedure.
Perhaps at some level coercion of consensus is constitutive of liberalism?
18
Arendt and Shklar both make arguments suggesting that politics is in some sense constitutive of law. For Arendt, action is fundamental to humans, we are zoon politikon; for Shklar, it is rather that no legal system on its own can secure the liberty 17 Both Schmitt and Luhmann have discussed this, albeit in two very differing ways; see the papers collected in Thornhill and Ashenden 2010 . 18 Shklar would later revisit and rethink the problem in the context of dealing with the founding of the American republic, whose promises had been hampered and contradicted by slavery. Only the fight for civil rights, which see saw as a struggle for positive liberty, would solve these problems -and even that fight she saw still as being far from over or as being a lasting achievement on which one could rest or rely upon (Shklar 1998b of citizens. Shklar gives us more than Arendt in terms of thinking through how law structures modern politics, and as such she is a better guide to the ways in which law can have an important depoliticising role in complex and differentiated social formations. Arendt oscillates between thinking that all is up for grabs, dissolved, and reaching for natural law arguments. Shklar is more sceptical, more thoroughly critical of legalism in all its forms, but perhaps rests more easily in a settled political context.
She doesn't face the same turmoil as Arendt, something perhaps due to generation, but also to temperament.
Finally, both thinkers offer a helpful dose of scepticism toward utopian ideals. This is linked to their respective refusals to imagine procedural solutions to thorny political problems. We've seen this in Arendt's reflections on evil and its domestication in western political philosophy. Her criticism of Kant for his attempt to rationalise evil, to find comprehensible motives for it, is a criticism of Kant's proceduralism. This sits nicely with Shklar's resistance to legalism as pure procedure and observation that there's always a substantive situation to be dealt with in any political conflict. This, in
turn, is what makes both resistant to producing systematic political theory. We can see this in the way that they each address the matter of justice.
We have seen that in On Totalitarianism Arendt takes up the totalitarian claim to obey the laws of nature and of history; she observes 'totalitarian lawfulness pretends to have found a way to establish the rule of justice on earth ' (2004 [1951] : 462), thus overcoming the discrepancy between legality and justice. Stretching forward across later work that could not be fully considered here, Arendt's comments would warrant comparison with Shklar's emphasis on injustice and the summum malum in The Faces of Injustice and Ordinary Vices. Conceived thus, Arendt and Shklar might be said to offer different parts of the same argument, rather than totally opposed positions:
Arendt provides a way of comprehending the sense of crisis that often attends beginnings, Shklar resists the language of crisis, but is perhaps the better guide to the matter of how political democracy can be lived in a complex society.
To conclude then we have argued here that it makes little sense to treat Arendt's and This does not mean to simply reduce different ideas to different circumstances. As we've tried to argue particularly in the last part of our discussion there will always remain maieutic impulses and intellectual surpluses which transcend the circumstances under which they first emerged. It's up to the next generation(s) to make sense of such distinctions in altered social and political contexts. 
